Commerical Law by Otten, Robin Dozier & Wilson, Floyd D.
Volume 15 
Issue 2 Spring 1985 
Spring 1985 
Commerical Law 
Robin Dozier Otten 
Floyd D. Wilson 
Recommended Citation 
Robin D. Otten & Floyd D. Wilson, Commerical Law, 15 N.M. L. Rev. 187 (1985). 
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol15/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more 
information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr 
COMMERCIAL LAW
ROBIN DOZIER OTTEN* and FLOYD D. WILSON**
I. INTRODUCTION
Although not accomplishing major changes in the area of commercial
law during the survey year, the New Mexico appellate courts established
some new trends and expanded upon existing ones. This Article discusses
these trends in the areas of contracts, business associations, insurance
law, and real estate contracts and points out some potential traps for the
unwary practitioner.
1I. CONTRACTS AND EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL THEORIES
A. Anti-Indemnity Clauses
In Guitard v. Gulf Oil Co.,' the New Mexico Court of Appeals inter-
preted an indemnity clause in a contract2 in conjunction with of one of
the state's limitation of indemnity statutes. 3 Drafters of contracts should
be aware of the case even though, in this instance, the court found a
rationale for enforcing the clause in spite of the statute. Unwarranted
reliance on this decision, however, may be risky. Courts faced with similar
questions in the future could find ample grounds to hold otherwise, and
could determine that an indemnity provision which does not comply with
the statutory requirements is void.
The plaintiff in Guitard, an employee of a third-party defendant, Har-
rison Western, sustained injuries when steel beams fell from a mining
conveyance. Defendant Gulf Oil Company operated the mining project
and Harrison Western was Gulf's contractor. After being sued by Guitard,
Gulf sued Harrison Western for indemnification, contribution, and re-
*J.D., University of New Mexico, 1981; Associate, Johnson and Lanphere, P.C.
**J.D., cum laude, Harvard Law School, 1974; Shareholder, Johnson and Lanphere, P.C.
1. 100 N.M. 358, 670 P.2d 969 (Ct. App. 1983). See also Kelly, Torts, 15 N.M.L. Rev.
(1985), in this issue (discussing Guitard).
2. The clause in the contract stated:
Contractor agrees to be responsible for and to indemnify and save harmless the
Owner from all loss or damage and any or all claims and suits, and costs of defending
same, arising by reason of accidents, injuries (including death) or damage to any
persons or property in connection with the Work performed by Contractor. ...
Contractor shall not be liable for any loss, damage or claims which are determined
to be due to the sole negligence of Owner.
100 N.M. at 362, 670 P.2d at 973.
3. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 56-7-2(A) (1978). See 100 N.M. at 361, 670 P.2d at 972.
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covery of damages. Harrison Western claimed that under New Mexico's
limitation of indemnity statute dealing with mines, the indemnity clause
in its contract with Gulf was void.4 The trial court agreed and granted
Harrison Western's motion for summary judgment.
The court of appeals overruled the trial court. The appellate court
interpreted the statutory language "arising from the . . concurrent neg-
ligence of the indemnity" to mean that an indemnitee cannot avoid liability
for his own negligence by inserting such a provision in his contract.
Gulf, therefore, was free to sue Harrison Western for that portion of the
damages attributable to Harrison Western. Although the appellate court
seemed to appreciate the public policy basis of the statute, which was to
promote safety at wells and mines, obviously the court disagreed with
the statutory scheme devised by the legislature to accomplish that purpose.
Gulf could have eased its burden if it had claimed a common-law right
of indemnity rather than a right based on a contract provision. By so
pleading, Gulf would have avoided the purview of the statute and any
possible application of Bartlett v. New Mexico Welder's Supply, Inc.6
because the abolition of joint and several liability did not undermine the
common-law theory of indemnity. To the extent Gulf's liability was based
upon its vicarious responsibility for the negligence of its contractor, Gulf
would have a common-law right of indemnity against the contractor. To
the extent the negligence of the contractor was not imputable to Gulf on
a vicarious liability theory, Gulf would not be liable to the employee for
the contractor's negligence and, therefore, would have no need for an
indemnity claim, given New Mexico's abolition of joint and several
liability.
4. 100 N.M. at 360, 670 P.2d at 971. This limitation of indemnity statute states:
Any agreement, covenant or promise contained in, collateral to or affecting any
agreement pertaining to any well for oil, gas or water, or mine for any mineral,
which purports to indemnify the indemnity against loss or liability for damages, for:
(1) death or bodily injury to person; or
(2) injury to property; or
(3) any other loss, damage or expense arising under either Paragraph (1) or (2) or
both; or
(4) any combination of these, arising from the sole or concurrent negligence of the
indemnity. . . or the agents or employees of the indemnities or any independent
contractor who is directly responsible to the indemnity, or from any accident
which occurs in operations carried on at the direction or under the supervision
of the indemnity or an employee or representative of the indemnity or in ac-
cordance with the methods and means specified by the indemnity or employees
or representatives of the indemnity, is against public policy and is void and
unenforceable. This provision shall not affect the validity of any insurance
contract or any benefit conferred by the Workmen's Compensation Act.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 56-7-2(A) (1978). A similar statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 56-7-1 (1978), relates to
contracts involving improvements to real property.
5. 100 N.M. at 361, 670 P.2d at 972.
6. 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
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B. Modification of Contract Terms
In two cases decided during the survey year, the court of appeals
discussed the circumstances under which it will modify written terms of
a contract. State ex rel. Conley Lott Nichols Machinery Co. v. Safeco
Insurance Co. ofAmerica7 involved the lease of equipment for a highway
construction project. The defendant contractor completed the project ear-
lier than expected and returned the equipment to the plaintiff lessor prior
to the expiration of the lease term. The contractor refused to pay the lease
payments due for the two-month period following the equipment's return
and preceding the lease's expiration. The lessor then sued to collect rent,
charges for overtime use of the machinery, and attorney's fees.
Before trial, the court refused to allow the contractor to present evidence
on trade custom and usage to support its claim that the contract terms
should be modified to allow the contractor to return the equipment at the
completion of the project and thus avoid liability for payments for the
remaining term of the lease. After determining that the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC) sections relied on by the contractor8 apply to leases
of goods as well as sales of goods, the court of appeals held that the
contract was not amenable to the construction sought by the contractor.
In upholding the terms of the contract, the court stated:
Evidence as to usage of trade is admissible in construing a written
contract (whether or not the language is ambiguous) to add to, sub-
tract from or qualify the terms of the agreement or to explain their
meaning, even if contradictory to the words therein .... Parol evi-
dence is not admissible, however, when it would change the basic
meaning of the contract and produce an agreement wholly different
from, wholly inconsistent with the written agreement and which tends
to distort the expressly stated written understanding of the parties.9
Unconscionability of a contract provision as the basis for modifying
the contract was at issue in Bowlin's, Inc. v. Ramsey Oil Co."0 The case
arose when Bowlin's discovered a shortage in deliveries that Ramsey Oil
made to one of Bowlin's retail outlets. The contract between Bowlin's
and Ramsey Oil and Texaco, Inc., another defendant, allowed a two-day
period following delivery within which Bowlin's was required to notify
Texaco of any shortage. Failure to comply with the notice provision
resulted, by the terms of the contract, in waiver of the claim.
Bowlin's asserted that the notice clause was unconscionable, unen-
forceable, and without reasonable commercial purpose. The trial court
7. 100 N.M. 440, 671 P.2d 1151 (Ct. App. 1983).
8. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§55-1-205, 55-2-202 (1978).
9. 100 N.M. at 444, 671 P.2d at 1155 (Ct. App. 1983) (citations omitted).
10. 99 N.M. 660, 662 P.2d 661 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 644, 662 P.2d 645 (1983).
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agreed. The appellate court, however, recognized that "a determination
of unconscionability in a contract clause is a matter of law. "" It reviewed
the considerable amount of evidence presented to the trial court as well
as various provisions of the UCC which are applicable. 2 The court held
that the clause was not unconscionable because the agreement was not
an adhesion contract and did not result from fraud, duress, or unequal
bargaining power.
In view of the fact that unconscionability is a matter of law, and because
the applicable statute provides that the issue of unconscionability is always
determined by the court and never by a jury, 3 it would enhance the
efficiency of the court system if questions such as this were presented to
the trial court in the form of a motion for partial summary judgment, or
perhaps in the form of a bifurcated hearing, prior to the trial on the merits
of the case as a whole. If this procedure had been followed in the Bowlin's
case, much valuable time of all the litigants and the court might have
been saved.
Recognition of the parties' ability to agree on the terms of a contract
and the New Mexico courts' willingness to enforce those terms is a
welcome change from the all too frequent eagerness displayed by some
courts to become an additional party to the business deal.
C. Release of Claims
The court of appeals, which firmly held the parties to their written
word in the Nichols and Bowlin's cases, took a markedly different stand
in the case of Hendren v. Allstate Insurance Co. 4 In Hendren, the plaintiff
suffered serious personal injuries in an automobile accident and claimed
against his father's uninsured motorist policy. A claims adjuster for the
insurance company then interviewed him. Eventually, Hendren signed a
release of claims and trust agreement after representations by the insurance
company agent that the agreement would result in payment for the full
amount allowable under the policy.
Hendren later discovered that his settlement could have been double
or triple the agreed upon amount. 5 He sued, claiming that the release
was signed under a mistake of law and fact and that the claims adjuster
11. Id. at 666, 662 P.2d at 667.
12. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 55-2-302, -303, -602, -607, -608 (1978).
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-2-302.
14. 100 N.M. 506, 672 P.2d 1137 (Ct. App. 1983).
15. Nine months after the Hendren decision, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided Lopez v.
Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 98 N.M. 166, 646 P.2d 1230 (1982), which recognized that insured
motorist coverage could be aggregated when one policy covers more than one vehicle. Id. at 172,
646 P.2d at 1236. In the Hendren case, either two or three autos were insured, so the coverage
could have been up to either $30,000 or $45,000. 100 N.M. at 508, 672 P.2d at 1139.
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underrepresented the amount of available coverage. The appellate court
denied the claims of mistake of law and fact.
The court applied a four part test to the misrepresentation claim. It
noted that the misrepresentation: (1) must be proved by clear and con-
vincing evidence; (2) must be of a material fact; (3) must be made to be
relied upon; and (4) must in fact be relied upon. 6 In this case, the limit
of coverage was obviously a material fact. The court also found that the
agent should have known that Hendren would rely upon her statements.
Finally, the court inferred that Hendren did rely on the agent's represen-
tations because the agent told Hendren that he would waste his money
if he hired an attorney, and Hendren did not seek legal counsel.
Particularly disturbing to the court was the agent's assertion to Hendren
that he need not retain an attorney. Because of the agent's statements
regarding the maximum coverage under the policy and her advice against
seeking legal representation, the court found that the insurance company
overreached and that summary judgment, therefore, was improper.
Decisions of this kind should caution practitioners. In conflict situations
such as the claims agent encountered in this case, attorneys have much
to lose if they fail to suggest or to recommend that unrepresented parties
seek independent legal advice. The disparity between Hendren's expertise
regarding intra-policy stacking and that of the insurance company also
affected the court's decision.' 7 Likewise, an attorney's expertise in com-
parison with that of a layman might trigger a duty to suggest that the
layman seek counsel.
D. UCC Warranties
1. Law of Sales Versus Law of Contracts
Perfetti v. McGhan Medical"8 presented the court of appeals with an
opportunity to contrast the law of sales with the law of contracts. Instead
of clarifying the distinctions, however, the court's decision leaves us
without focus.
The plaintiff in Perfetti suffered from the implantation of an unsatis-
factory mammary prosthesis produced by McGhan Medical. The pros-
thesis had two compartments, an inner one filled with gel and an outer
one filled with saline solution. After twenty-five months of use, the outer
envelope deflated because of a leakage of the solution. The trial court
presented three theories of liability to the jury: (1) product's liability;
16. 100 N.M. at 509, 672 P.2d at 1140 (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Anaya, 78 N.M.
101, 428 P.2d 640 (1967)).
17. 100 N.M. at 510-11, 672 P.2d at 1141-42.
18. 99 N.M. 645, 662 P.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1983).
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(2) express warranty; and (3) implied warranty. This section discusses
the two warranty issues.
The appellate court reviewed the express warranty issue on the basis
of section 55- 2-313(1)(a).19 The court noted that an "affirmation of fact
or promise"' 21 made by McGhan Medical to the surgeon who implanted
the prosthesis "which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis
of the bargain'2 would benefit the plaintiff because the surgeon acted as
her agent. 22 In addition, the court recognized that, "if there is an affir-
mation of fact which is a part of the basis of the bargain, there is no
independent 'reliance' requirement as to that affirmation of fact. , 23 The
confusion arose when the court proceeded from this point to discuss the
affirmation which the plaintiff claimed was an express warranty:
Warning
McGhan Medical Corporation is aware of the potential for leakage
in inflatable implants over an undefined time period. Considering the
chemical and physical properties of the material used in the manu-
facture of the inflatable implants, deflation is not expected. However,
long term results cannot be guaranteed by the manufacturer.24
The court stated two reasons for concluding that instructing the jury
on an express warranty theory was error. First, the plaintiff claimed that
only the last sentence of the warning constituted the affirmation. The
appellate court denied this claim because to recognize it would be to
allow words to be taken out of context. The court assumed, but did not
decide, that the affirmations formed a basis of the bargain and were,
therefore, an express warranty, but that there was no evidence that McGhan
Medical had breached the affirmation.
The court's second reason for finding no breach of express warranty
is more disturbing. The court asserted that "affirmations must be part of
the bargain." 25 This statement brings into question the court's earlier
statement that no independent reliance is necessary. According to Official
19. -N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-313(1) (1978) states that:
Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise;
(b) any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description;
(c) any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or
model.
20. 99 N.M. at 650, 662 P.2d at 651.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 650-51, 662 P.2d at 651-52.
23. Id. at 651, 662 P.2d at 652.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 652, 662 P.2d at 653.
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Comment 1 to section 55-2-313, an express warranty depends on "dick-
ered" aspects of the bargain. What is a "dickered" aspect if not a ne-
gotiated term upon which the proponent of that-term relied in reaching
the bargain? How can an express warranty ever be found in the sale of
goods if this type of negotiation is required? Is the court saying that
consumers cannot enforce an express warranty printed on a pamphlet
inside the carton of a small household appliance? Such an affirmation
could rarely be recognized as a dickered term. It is an unusual person
who chooses a toaster on the basis of the affirmations contained in the
written warranty. While such legal requirements as reliance and "dick-
ered" aspects may be meaningful in the context of a negotiated contract,
they are unseemly encumbrances in the law of sales.
The trial court also instructed the jury on two theories of implied
warranty: merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. The de-
fendant claimed error on the basis of both theories. The appellate court
agreed that, in a personal injury case, a claim based on a theory of product
liability may be identical to a claim of breach of implied warranty of
merchantability. However, until the New Mexico Supreme Court limits
the use of Uniform Jury Instructions to resolve this redundancy, trial
courts do not err if they allow instruction on both theories.
With regard to the claim of breach of warranty of merchantability, the
court inquired into the UCC requirement of privity of contract.26 After
citing authority from other jurisdictions,27 the court held that privity of
contract between the defendant and either the plaintiff or her surgeon was
not required. It is frustrating that the court acknowledged that section 55-
2-318 extends the warranty benefits to those persons beyond the persons
referred to in Comment 3 to the section28 and then provided no guidance
toward a better understanding of the extent of those included in the
distributive chain. This case challenged the court to define further the
class of people protected by the implied warranty of merchantability under
the New Mexico UCC, but the challenge was ignored.
2. Comparative Negligence
The recent increase in the number of jurisdictions recognizing com-
parative fault as a defense in negligence actions has spawned claims of
comparative fault as a defense to implied warranty actions. In Bowlin's,
26. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-314 (1978).
27. The court seems to have been guided by Western Equip. v. Sheridan Iron Works, 605 P.2d
806 (Wyo. 1980), and Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
28. Comment 3 to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-2-318 (1978) states:
The first alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the
family, household and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section in this
form is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law
on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other
persons in the distributive chain.
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Inc. v. Ramsey Oil Co.,29 the New Mexico Court of Appeals decided a
case complicated by tangled theories of liability and damages. This sit-
uation frequently arises when trial lawyers and judges mingle contract
theories with tort theories and further confuse one tort theory with another.
Without citing authority, the court of appeals stated that: "[C]omparative
liability is not part of the Uniform Commercial Code under which this
case is decided." 30 While this statement is correct in the context of Bow-
lin's, it may not be applicable in other situations.
Other jurisdictions have addressed this issue; their courts' rationales
are interesting. In Correia v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. ," a wrongful
death case with cross-claims by the defendant against the decedent's
employer, the United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts asked the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to decide certain
questions of law. Among the questions certified to the state court was:
"Does Massachusetts recognize contributory or comparative negligence
or fault as a full or partial defense to an action for personal injury or
wrongful death based on breach of warranty?" 32 The court answered
"No. 1133
The issue with which the Massachusetts court wrestled was essentially
the same as our court of appeals encountered in Perfetti;34 that is, is there
a distinction between a theory of strict liability and one of breach of
implied warranty? Both courts concluded that if there is any distinction,
and none is identified by either court, it is slight. The Massachusetts
court, however, went further in its discussion and noted that an action
for strict liability is justified on a much different basis than an action in
negligence .3 Therefore, the theory of implied warranty, like that of strict
liability, is inconsistent with the theory of comparative negligence.
29. 99 N.M. 660, 662 P.2d 661 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 644, 662 P.2d 645 (1983),
discussed supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
30. 99 N.M. at 672, 662 P.2d at 673.
31. 388 Mass. 342, 446 N.E.2d 1033 (1983).
32. Id. at -, 446 N.E.2d at 1039.
33. Id.
34. 99 N.M. 645, 662 P.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1983). See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
35. Simply stated, the policy of negligence liability presumes that people will, or at
least should, take reasonable measures to protect themselves and others from
harm. This presumption justifies the imposition of a duty on people to conduct
themselves in this way. A person harmed by one whose conduct falls below the
standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk,
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 282 (1965), may recover against the actor. How-
ever, if the injured person's unreasonable conduct also has been a cause of his
injury, his conduct will be accounted for in apportioning liability or damages.
Strict liability is justified on a much different basis .... Recognizing that the
seller is in the best position to ensure product safety, the law of strict liability
imposes on the seller a duty to prevent the release of "any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer" into the stream of
commerce. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1) (1965). This duty is unknown
[Vol. 15
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The assertion by the court in Bowlin's that consideration of contributory
negligence is inappropriate in a breach of implied warranty case is correct.
It would have been helpful, however, if the court of appeals had presented
some rationale, such as that set forth by the Massachusetts court, for this
statement.
I1. BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
A. Piercing the Corporate Veil
In deciding Harlow v. Fibron Corp.,36 the New Mexico Court of Ap-
peals discussed requirements for piercing the corporate veil. Most prac-
titioners involved in the practice of commercial law are faced, at one
time or another, with an irate client who is a creditor of an insolvent or
bankrupt corporate debtor and who is frustrated by the knowledge that
there are personal assets of the principals of the corporation sufficient to
pay the debt which are protected by the existence of a corporate entity.
It is helpful to have judicial guidelines when advising these clients of the
likelihood of successfully piercing the corporate veil.
In Harlow, the plaintiff purchased defective fiberglass pipe from Ki-
netics, Inc., a New Mexico corporation and one of the defendants in the
lawsuit. James Brock, another defendant, was a shareholder and president
of Kinetics. He was also president and controlling shareholder of two
other defendant companies, Midwest Equipment Co. and Mid-Tex Con-
struction Co. Kinetics was in financial difficulty by 1976, four years after
its incorporation, and Midwest, Mid-Tex, and Brock all began paying
Kinetics' debts. Meanwhile, Harlow obtained ajudgment against Kinetics
for damages incurred as a result of the purchase of defective pipe." Fibron
purchased the assets of Kinetics in December 1978, without knowledge
of the judgment. Harlow filed a New Mexico state court action claiming
that Fibron had violated the bulk transfer provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code.3" Harlow later amended his complaint to include claims
to pierce the corporate veil and to recover for fraud.
in the law of negligence and it is not fulfilled even if the seller takes all reasonable
measure to make his product safe. The liability issue focuses on whether the
product was defective and unreasonably dangerous and not on the conduct of the
user or the seller.
388 Mass. at -, 446 N.E.2d at 1039-40. The court notes that, in a strict liability context, a user
relinquishes the law's protection when he unreasonably uses a product which he knows to be defective
and dangerous and only then should his conduct be considered in determining liability. This conduct
then becomes the proximate cause of his injuries and the bar to his recovery is based on this proximate
cause element, not on contributory negligence or assumption of the risk. See id.
36. 100 N.M. 379, 671 P.2d 40 (Ct. App. 1983).
37. Id. at 381, 671 P.2d at 42. The judgment was rendered in an Oklahoma state court. Harlow
then sought full faith and credit on the Oklahoma judgment in federal court in Oklahoma. He obtained
a default judgment in the amount of $327,885.81. This judgment was registered in federal court in
New Mexico.
38. Id. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§55-6-101 to -110 (1978).
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The court of appeals noted that there are three requisites for obtaining
the equitable remedy of piercing the corporate veil. They are the existence
of: (1) an alter ego; (2) an improper purpose; and (3) proximate causa-
tion.39 Harlow is instructive because it is the first case in which the court
plainly states that findings of all three elements are necessary. If the
defending corporation is a mere instrumentality, that is, if it was not
operated "in a legitimate fashion to serve the valid goals and purposes
of that corporation but . . . functioned under the domination and control
and for the purposes of some dominant party,"' then the court must look
to see if the corporation used the domination and control for an improper
purpose. If the court also finds an improper purpose, then evidence of
proximate causation must exist. Only in the case where all three require-
ments are present will the court allow the corporate veil to be pierced.
Although the court in Harlow did not decide whether the facts of the
case met the alter ego requirement, it did decide that the plaintiff did not
prove an improper purpose. The court, therefore, refused to pierce the
corporate veil.
B. Fiduciary Duties of Partners
In the context of Covalt v. High,4 the New Mexico Court of Appeals
discussed the fiduciary duties of a partner. The court decided that, under
the facts of the case, a partner does not have a duty to negotiate and to
obtain an increase in the rental being received on partnership property.
The partnership in question was a general partnership which existed
without a written partnership agreement. Its purpose was to purchase real
estate and construct an office and warehouse for rental to Concrete Sys-
tems, Inc.42 Initially the corporation rented the building for five years.
At the end of that period, the partnership and the corporation negotiated
increases in the rental amount, but did not execute a new lease.
In January 1979, Covalt demanded that the partnership raise the rent
charged the corporation from $1,850 per month to $2,850. 4' High did
not agree. In August 1980, a written agreement dissolved the partnership.
Covalt then filed suit requesting a sale of the partnership property, an
accounting, and an award of punitive and actual damages.
39. 100 N.M. at 382, 671 P.2d at 43 (citing C. Krendl & J. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil:
Focusing the Inquiry, 55 Denver L.J. 1, 15 (1978)).
The "alter ego" requirement is referred to elsewhere as the "instrumentality" or "domination"
requisite. The term "alter ego" is used by the court and in this Article because that is the term used
by the courts in previous New Mexico decisions.
40. 100 N.M. at 382, 671 P.2d at 43 (quoting C. Krendl & J. Krendl, supra note 39, at 16).
41. 100 N.M. 700, 675 P.2d 999 (Ct. App. 1983).
42. Id. at 701, 675 P.2d at 1000. The plaintiff, Covalt, owned 25% of the shares of the corporation
and the defendant, High, owned 75% of the corporation.
43. Id. By this time, Covalt no longer worked for the corporation, but he retained his 25%
ownership.
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The trial court found that High had breached a fiduciary duty of fairness
to Covalt by failing to negotiate an increase in rent. The appellate court
disagreed. The court of appeals aptly pointed out that this case exemplifies
the importance of first arriving at an agreement between partners with
regard to the details of the conduct of partnership business and then
committing the agreement to paper.
Absent a written partnership agreement, the law imposes one. In such
a situation, the Uniform Partnership Act gives the majority of the part-
nership the authority to decide on the management or conduct of part-
nership business.' When the partnership is evenly divided on an issue,
as in Covalt, the status quo continues. The scenario changes somewhat
when the dispute is not between partners but instead is between the
partnership and a third person. In the latter situation, in spite of an internal
dispute, any partner has the authority to bind the partnership with respect
to third persons.
The Covalt court concluded that the proper remedy in that case was
dissolution of the partnership. While this is not a particularly surprising
or innovative result, it is of some interest that the court refused to impose
a fiduciary duty. A rental increase probably would have benefitted the
partnership, but lacking a written provision outlining the duty, the court
had little choice but to apply the statute.
IV. INSURANCE MATTERS
A. Punitive Damages and Attorney's Fees
The policy considerations involved in determining whether states should
allow insurance coverage for punitive damages make the question a dif-
ficult one to answer. In State ex rel. Conley Lott Nichols Machinery Co.
v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America,4 5 the New Mexico Court of Appeals
held that, because "[n]either the terms of the surety bond nor the statutory
provisions requiring the surety bond obligated Surety for payment of
punitive damages assessed against the Contractor,"" the trial court should
not have instructed the jury that the liability of the surety in this case
was as broad as the contractor's liability." The court concluded that the
language of the surety bond did not extend to liability for punitive dam-
ages. Unfortunately, because of this conclusion, the court did not find it
necessary to discuss insurance against punitive damages.
44. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 54-1-18(H) (1978).
45. 100 N.M. 440, 671 P.2d 1151 (Ct. App. 1983), discussed supra notes 7-9 and accompanying
text.
46. 100 N.M. at 445, 671 P.2d at 1156.
47. Id. In Nichols Machinery, a lessor sued the contractor and surety for the damages incurred
by lessor when the contractor failed to pay the full amount of heavy equipment leases. The surety
was joined because it provided the payment bond which N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-4-19 (1978) obligated
the contractor to obtain.
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The court did address one matter of first impression in New Mexico:
whether a surety must pay attorney's fees and other collection costs
demanded by the contractor's lessor. In Nichols Machinery, the lease
agreements between the lessor and the contractor provided that if the
lessor turned the account over to an attorney for collection, the lessee
was to pay the attorney's fees and other costs of collection. Basing its
rationale on a United States Supreme Court decision48 on a similar issue
involving the Miller Act,49 and noting that the New Mexico Little Miller
Act is, in pertinent part, identical to the federal act,5" the New Mexico
court held that reasonable attorney's fees are allowed where the underlying
contract specifically allows for the collection of such fees.
With regard to proof of reasonableness of attorney's fees, the Nichols
Machinery court reiterated the factors set forth in Fryar v. Johnsen."
Practitioners should assume that when they must prove the reasonableness
of attorney's fees as an element of damages in a contract action they
should gather information for presentation to the courts in accordance
with the Fryar v. Johnsen factors.
B. Conditions Subsequent Versus Exclusions
The question before the New Mexico Supreme Court in Security Mutual
Casualty Co. v. O'Brien52 was whether an exclusion in an insurance policy
must be causally connected with the accident before coverage may be
denied on the basis of the exclusion. The supreme court disagreed with
the trial court and the court of appeals and held that a causal connection
between a policy exclusion and an accident did not have to be shown by
an insurance company in denying coverage.
Security Mutual involved exclusions to a hull policy and a liability
policy on an airplane. The exclusions stated that neither policy applied
while the aircraft was in flight unless the airworthiness certification or
48. United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210 (1957).
49. 40 U.S.C. § 270(a)-(e) (Supp. IV 1980). The Miller Act requires the general contractor on
federal construction projects to provide a labor and material bond from a surety company to insure
that the subcontractors, materialmen, and laborers working on the project are paid. As a practical
matter, bonds provided with respect to federal construction projects are essentially identical in form
to bonds provided with respect to state or private construction projects.
50. 100 N.M. at 446, 671 P.2d at 1157. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §13-4-19 (1978).
51. 93 N.M. 485, 601 P.2d 718 (1979). Fryar was a worker's compensation case in which the
court discussed facts which must be proved to recover attorneys' fees. Those factors are: (1) the
time and labor required-the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and skill required; (2)
the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services; (3) the amount involved and the
results obtained; (4) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; and (5) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services. These factors
have been used by the courts since 1979 when determining fees in contexts other than worker's
compensation. Id. at 487, 601 P.2d at 720. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-
106 (1979).
52. 99 N.M. 638, 662 P.2d 639 (1983).
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certificate was in full force and effect at the time of the accident.5a In
answering the question before it, the court noted that there is New Mexico
law to the effect that an insurer does not have to show a causal connection
between a policy exclusion and an auto accident to deny coverage.' The
court further recognized that both the case before it and the earlier case,
which required a showing of substantial prejudice, involved policy ex-
clusions.
The court next acknowledged the distinction between a condition sub-
sequent, which has the effect of terminating or suspending insurance, and
an exclusion, which states that no insurance ever existed with respect to
the excluded activity. The court's conclusion was that a showing of sub-
stantial prejudice is relevant to cases involving condition subsequent clauses,
but is not relevant to cases involving policy exclusions.
In reaching its conclusion, the Security Mutual court relied on the
misleading distinction between an exclusion and a condition subsequent.
The distinction must be based on the policy reasons for the court's re-
quirement of proof, rather than whether an exclusion or a condition
subsequent is involved.
In the 1980 case of Foundation Reserve Insurance Co. v. Esquibel,"
the court, quoting a Washington decision, stated: "The risk-spreading
theory of liability 'should operate to afford to affected members of the
public-frequently innocent third persons-the maximum protection pos-
sible consonant with fairness to the insuror.' "56 The court then held that
if the condition subsequent which is breached by the insured is a material
or substantial breach, the insuror must show that it has suffered substantial
prejudice as a result of the breach before coverage can be denied. Sanchez
v. Kemper Insurance Co.,57 decided in 1981, also involved breach of a
condition subsequent." But in Sanchez, the court held that no prejudice
need be shown. Yet, the issue in both cases was whether the insurance
company had to show that the breach by the insured of the condition
subsequent caused prejudice to the company. Since the question was the
same and the answer different, the court must have distinguished between
the cases on a basis other than that they involved breaches of conditions
subsequent.
A careful reading of Peterson v. Romero,59 Foundation Reserve, and
53. Id. at 639, 662 P.2d 640.
54. Id. See Peterson v. Romero, 88 N.M. 483, 542 P.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1975).
55. 94 N.M. 132, 607 P.2d 1150 (1980).
56. Id. at 134, 607 P.2d at 1152 (quoting Oregon Auto Ins. Co. v. Salzberg, 85 Wash. 2d 372,
376-77, 535 P.2d 816, 819 (1975)).
57. 96 N.M. 466, 632 P.2d 343 (1981).
58. In Foundation Reserve, the "condition" breached was a cooperation clause; in Sanchez, it
was a time-to-sue provision.
59. 88 N.M. 483, 542 P.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1975).
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Sanchez shows that the distinction is based upon the policy basis for the
denial of coverage. If the parties to the insurance contract bear the brunt
of the denial of coverage, as in Peterson, Sanchez, and Security Mutual,
courts have held that no prejudice or causal relationship must be shown.
If, however, there is a third-party beneficiary of the insurance policy who
stands to suffer most from denial of coverage, as in Foundation Reserve,
the court should require a showing of causal connection or prejudice
before allowing the insurance company to deny coverage.
V. REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS
The real estate financing device known in New Mexico as the real
estate contract reached the height of its appeal during the years of soaring
mortgage interest rates. Since interest rates charged by commercial lenders
have subsided somewhat and since the flexibility of mortgage terms and
rates has increased, the real estate contract has again become merely one
of several options.
The paramount advantage of the real estate contract from the seller's
point of view is that it provides an efficient remedy upon default. The
standard contract provision allows the seller, when the purchaser is in
default, to demand that the default be cured. If the default remains uncured
for a certain period after the demand, the seller may record an affidavit
specifying the default and forfeiture in the County Clerk's office, remove
the deeds from escrow, record the special warranty deed from purchaser
to seller (thus merging both equitable and legal title to the property in
seller), and retain all payments made by purchaser as liquidated damages.
The seller thus avoids the expensive and time-consuming exercise of a
foreclosure lawsuit. Or does he?
New Mexico courts have made exceptions to the enforcement of the
terms of real estate contracts when the resulting forfeiture results in
unfairness which "shocks the conscience of the court. "' Absent such
unfairness, the parties are free to enforce the contract as written.61
The court in Eiferle v. Toppino62 found facts which shocked its con-
science. The real estate contract involved was a standard form which
provided for a down payment, assumption of the existing mortgage, and
monthly payments of the owner's equity. After five years of payment
60. See generally Note, Increased Risks of Forfeiture and Malpractice Resulting from the Use
of Real Estate Contracts: Albuquerque National Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Inc., 15 N.M.L.
Rev. 99 (1985); Note, The Future of the Real Estate Contract in New Mexico: Huckins v. Ritter,
14 N.M.L. Rev. 531, 533-38 (1984); and Note, The Real Estate Contract in New Mexico: Eiferle
v. Toppino, 8 N.M.L. Rev. 247, 249-59 (1978) (discussing real estate contracts in New Mexico).
61. See Bishop v. Beecher, 67 N.M. 339, 355 P.2d 277 (1960).
62. 90 N.M. 469, 565 P.2d 340 (1977). See Note, The Real Estate Contract in New Mexico:
Eiferle v. Toppino, 8 N.M.L. Rev. 247 (1978).
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pursuant to the contract, the mortgagee returned a dishonored check to
the purchaser and demanded payment of existing delinquencies within
eleven days. The sellers were notified of the mortgagee's demand. The
purchasers met the demand within the time period allowed by the mort-
gagee, but the sellers had sent their own demand letter prior to the date
the default of the mortgage was cured. Thereafter, the escrow agent
refused to accept payments from the purchaser because the twenty-five
dollar fee required by the contract for sending a demand letter had not
been paid. The seller exercised his remedy under the contract and filed
the special warranty deed. On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court
remanded the case for a hearing to determine the amount of delinquencies
and to set a reasonable time within which the purchaser could cure. The
opinion in Eiferle indicates that the circumstance which "shocked the
conscience of the court" was the fact that the seller ignored the mort-
gagee's allowance of time to make the payment and proceeded to take
the property.
In Hale v. Whitlock,63 the court agreed that the trial court had properly
exercised its equity jurisdiction in allowing the purchaser time to pay off
the entire balance of the contract rather than suffer forfeiture. 64 This
decision gave some credence to the argument that the equity of redemption
exists in the context of a real estate contract.
The real estate contract case decided during this survey year, Huckins
v. Ritter,65 further defined the circumstances under which exceptions to
the forfeiture provisions should be made. In Huckins, the purchaser made
a down-payment of approximately one-third of the purchase price of the
property. The sale occurred in July 1981; payment of the seller's equity
was due in October 1981. The purchaser only occupied the property until
February 1982. The court held that to allow seller to retain the full down
payment would constitute an unwarranted forfeiture.
The difficulty created by this line of cases, of which Huckins is the
latest addition, is that it leaves the seller of property by real estate contract
in an uncertain position should the purchaser default and the seller exercise
his rights under the contract. One possible solution to the problem is to
draft real estate contracts so as to attempt to avoid situations which, in
the past, have shocked the courts. One large real estate firm, which
63. 92 N.M. 657, 593 P.2d 754 (1979).
64. The real estate contract in Hale was entered into by the parties in 1966. For the next 11
years, the purchaser paid sporadically and the seller did not object to the delinquencies. In 1977,
the seller sold her interest in the contract and the new owner demanded payment of all delinquencies.
The purchaser brought a declaratory action in which the trial court found that the seller was entitled
to retake the property, but allowed the purchaser time to pay the entire contact balance.
65. 99 N.M. 560, 661 P.2d 52 (1983). See Note, The Future of the Real Estate Contract in New
Mexico: Huckins v. Ritter, 14 N.M.L. Rev. 531 (1984).
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handles many sales by real estate contract, has drafted its form contract
to allow what is essentially a redemption period beyond the usual notice
period. However, the limitations of this sort of defensive drafting are
obvious. Most purchasers and sellers by contract use a standard printed
form and cannot or do not seek modification of the form before executing
it. Because of the nature of the judiciary, perhaps the legislature is a more
appropriate forum for seeking a greater degree of predictability in en-
forcement of real estate contracts.6
VI. CONCLUSION
One of the most important policies which the courts can promote in
the area of Commercial Law is certainty of result. This policy has, to a
large degree, been undermined in the past by court decisions which appear
to have subordinated the expressed intent of the parties to after the fact
judgments as to what would be a "fair" result, apparently giving little
weight to the thought that, in almost all cases, the most "fair" result is
the result previously agreed upon by the parties and evidenced by the
contract. Similar confusion has been generated by the courts' failure to
arrive at a coherent set of legal principles upon which the rights and
obligations of the parties can be determined under various sets of cir-
cumstances. These rights and obligations of the parties, in many instances,
are substantively different, depending upon whether the court, in a par-
ticular instance, applies tort, contract, or other sets of legal principles.
The recent decisions of our New Mexico courts, however, reflect a re-
versal of this trend and further reflect a recognition by our courts of the
substantive importance of certainty of result.
A notable exception to this trend is in the area of real estate contracts,
in which the courts continue to decide cases almost entirely upon what
they perceive to be "fair" in a particular case, with very- little substantive
guidance as to overall principles which would promote the principle of
certainty of result.
66. See Note, supra note 65, at 541-43.
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